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ABSTRACT
The Patterns and Prosecutions of Media Leakers
by
Julia Lipkins

Advisor: Karen Miller

This paper examines the cases of government employees who are responsible for the disclosure
of confidential information to the press, known as media leakers. I claim that the government and
media leaker engage in a series of patterned responses, which leads to both the disclosure of
information, and prosecution of the leaker. More specifically, I demonstrate how the
government’s executive branch manages a game of leaks, in which ‘illegitimate’ leakers are
separated from elite officials who also leak, but are often spared from prosecution because they
are considered ‘legitimate’ players of the game. Although the boundaries surrounding
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ leakers may appear as fixed and stable, they are actually constantly
in flux due to momentary social pressures. I demonstrate that regardless of the ‘illegitimate’
leaker’s claims to be a whistleblower or serve the public’s interests within the boundaries of the
law, the executive and in turn the judiciary will respond with aggressive and retaliatory
measures, particularly if the content of the leak embarrasses the executive or threatens the
American war project.
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“…We often view conspiracies of silence as far less threatening than the efforts to end them.”
-Eviatar Zerubavel, The Elephant in the Room

“Seven grave and reverend Senators have been assigned to the ridiculous task of trying to find
out how the secrets of executive sessions leak out. These dignified gentlemen are expected to go
smelling about and asking questions for the purpose of ascertaining how newspaper reporters get
at such matters of public interests as transpire though the closed doors of the Senate, when they
know perfectly well that the only possible source of information, direct or indirect, is the
Senators themselves. If the matter is to be made is to be made the subject of inquiry, the Senate
in the secrecy of its star chamber should search the hearts of its own members. The executive
sessions are a ridiculous heritage of the past anyway, and are so regarded by many Senators, who
fail to be impressed by the sanctity of their “secret” doings. They are made the more ridiculous
by the promptness with which anything of consequence that is done becomes known, and the
climax of absurdity is reached in this solemn inquiry as to how it happens.”
-New York Times, Editorial, February 27, 1890
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Introduction
This paper examines the cases of government employees who are responsible for the
disclosure of confidential information to the press, known as media leakers. I claim that the
government and media leaker engage in a series of patterned responses, which leads to both the
disclosure of information, and prosecution of the leaker. More specifically, I demonstrate how
the government’s executive branch manages a game of leaks, in which ‘illegitimate’ leakers are
separated from elite officials who also leak, but are often spared from prosecution because they
are considered ‘legitimate’ players of the game. Although the boundaries surrounding
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ leakers may appear as fixed and stable, they are actually constantly
in flux due to momentary social pressures. I demonstrate that regardless of the ‘illegitimate’
leaker’s claims to be a whistleblower or serve the public’s interests within the boundaries of the
law, the executive and in turn the judiciary will respond with aggressive and retaliatory
measures, particularly if the content of the leak embarrasses the executive or threatens the
American war project.
This paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 offers a brief overview of relevant
literature related to media leaks. I also provide an in-depth review of David Pozen’s “The Leaky
Leviathan,” which is a pivotal examination of media leaks and leakers. Pozen dissects “leak
panic,”1 in which politicians feign outrage over leaks, while they simultaneously leak
information as part of everyday communication exchanges within the government. Pozen offers
a comprehensive legal analysis of the game of leaks, and I build upon his work from a
sociological perspective.

1

Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of
Information,” 513.
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In Chapter 2, I utilize Erving Goffman’s schema of performative roles to illustrate
relationships between back region actors in the government and the media. I expand Goffman’s
conception of informers and go-betweens to demonstrate how leakers and members of the media
rely upon one another to communicate both within government and in front of the public.
Additionally, I employ Goffman’s descriptions of front and back regions2 to demonstrate how
leaker-informers curate back region scenes and props, and deliver them to media-go-betweens,
who frame the content front region publics. In theorizing the leak, I also reexamine Goffman’s
assessment of shame and embarrassment as byproducts of definitional disruptions.3 I claim that
these emotional responses are part of the government’s motivations to retaliate against
‘illegitimate’ leakers.
The prosecution of Thomas Drake, a former N.S.A. employee and leaker, serves as my
case study for Chapter 3. In analyzing the Drake case, I propose a template that illustrates how a
back region government employee evolves into a leaker-informer. Drake was initially motivated
to act after the Bush Administration portrayed contradictory front and back region “definitions of
the situation”4 in the wake of 9/11. Leakers like Drake are often thought of as lone wolves,5 but I
demonstrate that they actually part of a team of dissenters. These groups attempt to voice their
concerns through ‘proper’ channels, but are often rebuked by their superiors in the government.
Following the rejection, Drake and other leakers turn to the press to give voice to their concerns.
I explain how Drake, an ‘illegitimate’ player in the game of leaks, was targeted by both the Bush
and Obama Administrations, who framed his crime of disclosure as a crime against the sacred
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Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 106.
Goffman, 13; Goffman, “Embarrassment and Social Organization.”
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body of the American soldier. The Drake case also illuminates the legal and illegal measures that
administrations will employ if the executive is shamed by the content of the leak, or perceives
that the leak threatens the American war project.
In Chapter 4, I examine the case of Daniel Ellsberg, the famed leaker of the Pentagon
Papers. I explain how his behavior, and that of the government’s, follows the template of
patterned responses laid out in Chapter 3. Like Drake, Ellsberg was motivated by the executive’s
contradictory front and back region “definitions of the situation.”6 Although Ellsberg is often
remembered as acting alone, he too worked with a group of dissenters who initially sought to
express their concerns through ‘proper’ and appointed channels. After Ellsberg and his
‘teammates’ were rebuffed, he sought redress through the media. In Ellsberg’s case, it is evident
that regardless of his motivations for leaking, he was targeted by the Nixon administration
because he both shamed the executive and threatened the American war project.
In the concluding chapter, I review the cases discussed throughout this paper and briefly
examine the Trump Administration’s response to media leaks. Additionally, I pose questions
about the ever-changeable boundaries that surrounding the ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ leakers.

6

Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 83.
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Chapter 1: Review of “The Leaky Leviathan”
There is a thin but growing body of interdisciplinary literature on media leaks. Legal
scholars, including Margaret Kwoka,7 Yochai Benkler,8 Mary-Rose Papandrea,9 and Lili Levi10
have written extensively about leaks in the context of First Amendment Rights. Agnes Ku11 and
Christopher Bail12 have explored the relationships between media leaks, the public sphere, and
state secrecy from a sociological perspective. Bail, who draws on cultural sociology, symbolic
interaction, and ethnomethodology, offers a compelling theory about how civil society actors use
media leaks to highlight an administration’s contradictory behaviors, and challenge their
epistemic authority.13 As I am interested in the selective prosecution of media leakers, I have
found the work of David Pozen, a scholar of constitutional law, most germane to my research.
For his 2013 article, “The Leaky Leviathan,” Pozen conducted interviews with government
officials and journalists, and drew on political and legal theories to scrutinize the “dramatic
disconnect between the ways our laws and our leaders condemn leaking in the abstract and the
way they condone it in practice.”14 Underneath this disconnect, Pozen discovered an
“information control regime,”15 which is managed and maintained to benefit members of the
executive branch and media elites, the primary purveyors and receivers of leaks.16 This review is
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not an exhaustive summary of Pozen’s findings, but rather an overview and critique of his
conclusions that are relevant to my research.

What is a Media Leak?
In “The Leaky Leviathan,” Pozen restricts his analysis to leaks about national security
issues. However, his definition of leaks could be applied to disclosures of any theme. Pozen
describes leaks as:
(i) a targeted disclosure (ii) by a government insider (employee, former employee,
contractor) (iii) to a member of the media (iv) of confidential information the divulgence
of which is generally proscribed by law, policy, or convention (v) outside of any formal
process (vi) with an expectation of anonymity.17
The motivation for leakers to disclose is an issue explored by Pozen, in addition to Stephen Hess,
a Nixon staffer and author, and Martin Arnold, a journalist for the New York Times.18 Disclosures
are often described and classified by leaker’s motivation; for example, there is the leak to “affect
government policy;” the “self-serving leak” to protect an individual’s reputation; the “angry
leak” made by a disgruntled employee; and the “threat leak,” employed by the military to induce
public fear in order to secure their spending budgets.19 Additionally, Arnold describes the “trial
balloon,” in which government officials will use leaks to “test the waters” for public reactions in
regards to new policies or slogans.20 Pozen and Hess both note that leaks often fall across
categories, and that leakers “may have multiple motivations or goals, some of them
unconscious.”21
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Government officials often respond to media reports that contain leaked information with
performative episodes of “leak panic.”22 Trump, for example, performs outrage over leaks on
Twitter; on May 14, 2018, he tweeted “The so-called leaks coming out of the White House are a
massive over exaggeration put out by the Fake News Media in order to make us look as bad as
possible. With that being said, leakers are traitors and cowards, and we will find out who they
are!”23 Despite such fervent claims of wrongdoing, media leaks are in fact a “routine method of
communication about government.”24 Journalists have noted that leaks of classified or sensitive
information are regarded as “the coin of [the] business”25 or the “oil in the machine.”26 In March
2017, during an episode of leak panic concerning James Comey’s testimony before Congress,
Carl Bernstein tweeted, “I can state w/confidence that many intel members now decrying 'leaks'
of classified info have themselves 'leaked' classified info knowingly.”27 Pozen explains how
leaks are simply one method of communication that members of the government use to “push
information”28 within and across agencies. Leaks and counter-leaks can function as a proxy
debate, in which officials argue their perspectives on specific issues or policies though the
confidential information they provide to journalists.29 Pozen writes, “Underneath the surface of
the stories we read in the newspapers citing anonymous U.S. officials, lies an elaborate
intragovernmental communicative economy.”30

22
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Who are the Leakers?
Leaks are not only a commonplace occurrence, but they are also most often distributed
by government officials in “leadership positions.”31 Pozen writes, “The ship of the state, one
often hears, is the only known vessel that leaks from the top - starting, that is, from the White
House itself.”32 Unlike mid or low-level bureaucrats, who might need physical evidence to gain
the attraction of reporters and editors at the New York Times, Washington Post, and other elite
media organizations, senior government officials are a prima facie trusted source.33 Such
officials, Pozen claims, are unlikely to be accused of leaking a deluge of documents,34 like
Edward Snowden or Chelsea Manning, as they are already socialized into “Washington power
culture”35 and have the ear of elite reporters.
Prior to the Trump Administration, there had only been between 12 and 25 criminal
prosecutions of leakers in the history of the United States.36 The leaker’s socialization and
enmeshment in “Washington power culture”37 underlies some of the government’s reluctance to
prosecute; so often the road to the source of the leak leads back to the upper echelons of
government.38 The Valerie Plame affair exemplifies why the executive branch often finds
prosecution of leakers a risky endeavor.39 In the Plame case, a Special Prosecutor charged
Scooter Libby, the Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, for lying under oath during an F.B.I.
investigation of a leak relating to the unmasking of Plame, a C.I.A. operative. “Formal leak
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investigations,” Pozen writes, “risk exposing top officials’ efforts to manipulate the secrecy rules
and marginalize opponents, among other machinations.”40 In order to avoid formal leak
investigations that implicate powerful government officials, a system of “permissive neglect”41
towards leakers has been instituted instead. Tepid and ad-hoc regulation42 of leaks not only
serves to protect high-level political appointees and bureaucrats from legal entanglements, but it
also facilitates an administration’s ability to anonymously distribute and frame its agendas in the
press.43

The Leak-Plant Continuum
The movement of secret or classified information from inside the government to the press
can take the form of a leak, a plant, or as Pozen explains, a combination of the two, which he
labels a “pleak.”44 While plants are often “made or directed by the President and his immediate
advisors.”45 leaks are generally the work of lower-level employees who act without any
authorization from the administration. Snowden, an NSA subcontractor, and Manning, a soldier,
are prototypical leakers in Pozen’s scheme. In contrast, “planting,” or authorized disclosing, “is
not an incidental practice of a few craven officials. It is programmatic, a mode of governance.”46
Instead of formal, transparent pronouncements the plant affords an administration “wiggle
room”47 to push its agenda while eluding liability or blame:
Depending on the context, they [plants] may allow the White House to circumvent or
cajole the career bureaucracy, to communicate more efficiently with foreign
40

Pozen, 571.
Pozen, 546.
42
Pozen, 616.
43
Pozen, 559–60.
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governments, to send signals and warnings to adversaries without formally engaging
them, to float trial balloons, to respond rapidly to breaking developments, to preserve
plausible deniability if an initiative is poorly received or an assertion turns out to be false,
and generally to impart information about executive branch policies without officially
acknowledging those policies and thereby inviting unwanted forms of accountability or
constraint.48
A White House official told Pozen that in regards to national security matters, planting is part of
“every rollout of everything significant we do.”49 However, not all privileged or classified
information conveyed to the press is a pure-plant or a pure-leak.50 Rather, there’s a spectrum that
reflects “the degree to which the President has expressly or impliedly blessed a disclosure.”51
Pleaks, which are in between the “poles” of leaks and plants, have a “quasi-authorized
character”52 and exist within a “vast, liminal space in which authorization [by the President] may
be contested.”53 As Pozen describes, pleakers “are not the President’s proxies but they are not
entirely unfaithful agents either.”54
The absence of clear administrative guidelines surrounding disclosures, in addition to
“ambiguous” authorization for specific disclosures, serves not only to insulate pleakers from
legal liability, but also socializes them to perceive the ‘lines’ surrounding content that is
‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ to disclose.55 Phillip Carter, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Detainee Policy, told Pozen that “part of the trust instilled in political appointees
is that they have the judgment to talk about what’s appropriate and not talk about what’s

48
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inappropriate.”56 The system of permissive neglect socializes “institutional insiders”57 to develop
this “judgment” through informal sanctions58 which are meted out by higher-ranked insiders and
peers, rather than through formal legal prosecution. Pleakers help to maintain the “legal and
bureaucratic fog”59 surrounding leaks, which Pozen explains, “is not a design defect but a critical
feature of the executive’s information control regime... Leakiness preserves the President’s
plausible deniability as to his role in the disclosure, if not in the underlying policy as well.”60

Conclusion
“The Leaky Leviathan” methodically demonstrates how leaks are a standard, everyday
method of communication used by government officials and members of the media. Pozen’s
insight about pleaks supports his detailed legal analysis about how the executive wields power
through a purposefully leaky “information control regime.”61 Although Pozen’s study is astute
and extremely valuable, it does not offer a sociological analysis on the selective and retaliatory
prosecution of media leakers. In the coming chapters, I build upon Pozen’s framework and use a
sociological lens to examine the functions and patterns of leaks.

56
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Chapter 2: A Sociological Approach to the Interpretation of Media Leaks
Bail writes that Erving Goffman’s “sociology reminds us that the power of the state is
deeply dependent on their reputation before the public.”62 Goffman employs dramaturgical terms
and principles to explain how individuals and groups formulate and perform identities through
speech, gestures, behavior, and other modes of interactive expressions.63 While Bail and I both
draw from Goffman’s theories related to reputation management, Bail focuses on Goffman’s
work on framing,64 and in this chapter, I expand upon Goffman’s concept of “information
games”65 as described in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. For Goffman, the
“communication process” is a “kind of information game – a potentially infinite cycle of
concealment, discovery, false revelation, and rediscovery.”66 Leaks are a type of communication
process that is performed by people in specific roles within the government and press. In order to
theorize the use of leaks, I employ Goffman’s classifications of different performative roles to
reveal the individuals and groups who enact cyclical information games through the curation and
diffusion of media leaks.

Information Games
Pozen, along with other legal scholars67 and journalists,68 have referred to the “game of
leaks”69 in their examinations of unauthorized national security disclosures. Such a term is

62
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reminiscent of Goffman’s “information games,”70 which occur on stages separated into “front”
and “back regions.”71 Official, formal performances occur in the front region, while off-therecord performances transpire in back region, “where the suppressed facts make an
appearance.”72 It is in the back region where actors “step out of character” and contradict their
front region personas.73 The “illusions and impressions”74 maintained in the front region are in
fact crafted in the back region.
The game of leaks (which includes pleaks and plants) 75 is part of a larger back region
information game that is played between elite members of the media and government insiders.
In Goffmanian terms, a media leak is a scene or prop from the back region that has been
transposed (most often intentionally) to the front region. For example, an unedited video clip of
Donald Trump making crude remarks was leaked to the press about a month before the 2016
presidential election.76 In response to the leak, Trump said, “This was locker-room banter, a
private conversation that took place many years ago. Bill Clinton has said far worse to me on the
golf course — not even close. I apologize if anyone was offended.”77 The leaked video of
Trump’s “locker-room banter” is a back region performance brought to the fore with the
intention of directing the attention of front region publics. Leaks provide a momentary window
for audience members to intrude upon and reframe the everyday, back region performances of
governance, media production, and the connective spaces between the two.

70
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Leakers as Informers
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman describes a variety of roles that
people inhabit in their daily existence. He identifies fundamental roles (performers, audiences,
and outsiders), in addition to “discrepant roles.”78 An “informer” is one such discrepant role, as
the individual “pretends to the performers to be a member of their team, is allowed to come
backstage and to acquire destructive information, and then openly or secretly sells out the show
to the audience.”79 Goffman continues:
If it appears that the individual first joined the team in a sincere way and not with the
premeditated plan of disclosing its secrets, we sometimes call him a traitor, turncoat, or
quitter, especially if he is the sort of person who ought to have made a decent teammate.
The individual who all along has meant to inform on the team, and originally joins only
for this purpose is sometimes called a spy. It has frequently been noted, of course, that
informers, whether traitors or spies, are often in an excellent position to play a double
game, selling out the secrets of those who buy secrets from them.80
I employ Goffman’s schema to identify leakers and whistleblowers, regardless of their
motivations for disclosing, as variations of Goffman’s informers. Leaker-informers do not begin
their government service with the intention of spying on the teammates, but they do play a
“double game,”81 as they are permitted to witness and participate in back region performances,
and then ‘sell out the show,’82 not directly to the audience, but to the press. One well-known
example a leaker-informer is Mark Felt, more commonly known as Deepthroat. As Associate
Director at the FBI, he played an extensive double-game by providing information on the
Watergate break-in to journalist Carl Bernstein, all the while performing outrage and disgust
over the Washington Post’s reporting before his colleagues and superiors in the back region. 83
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In Leak: Why Mark Felt Became Deep Throat, author Max Holland writes that “Felt was a cool
customer, and often able to turn his dual identity as the leaker and recipient of complaints [about
the leaks] to his advantage.”84 Nixon expressed constant confusion and rage at the Watergate
leaks, which “kept the White house off balance and uncertain about its own judgements.” As a
leaker-informer, Felt ‘sold out the show’85 with curated scenes leaked to reporters, and
maintained his cover as a dutiful employee and loyal to Nixon.

The Press as Go-Betweens
Leaker-informers rely on the press to usher scenes and props from the back region to
front region publics. In the game of leaks, the press bears a resemblance to the discrepant role of
“go-betweens.”86 Goffman writes, “The go-between learns the secrets of each side and gives
each side the true impression that he will keep its secrets; but he tends to give each side the false
impression that he is more loyal to it than to the other.”87 Members of the media can claim
fidelity to publics, but they must also maintain a loyalty to their sources - leaker-informers - who
provide them with the scenes and props that populate their stories.
Although presidential administrations and the press often act as adversaries in the front
region, back region performances have a less antagonistic tone. “The hostility between Trump’s
White House and the press may be unusually acute,” reads a May 2017 Politico Magazine
article, “but it is not interrupting any decades-long streak of bonhomie.”88 A prime example of
this back region bonhomie can be found in the relationship between Trump and Jeff Zucker,
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president of CNN. Zucker was the executive at NBC who had approved “The Apprentice” for
prime time. Trump has referred to Zucker as his “personal booker,” i.e. a mid-level television
producer who arranges interviews.89 In an April 2017 New York Times article, Jonathan Mahler
labeled Zucker and Trump as engaged in a “symbiotic relationship.” Mahler described how in a
meeting with members of the press, Trump berated CNN, but Zucker described it as part of game
between friends. “He was attacking CNN, but in a little more of a playful way, because he knew
me…He was being an ass but in a playful way,”90 said Zucker. When the formal, front region
meeting was completed, Trump and Zucker could revert to their back region bonhomie.
“He was incredibly chummy with me, incredibly friendly…It was the old Donald-andJeff relationship — the relationship of two people who have known each other for 15
years, who had a long relationship, who always had a cordial relationship. And by the
way, the photographer took several photos of me and Donald together.”91
Despite blustering, front-region performances of leak panic,92 leaker-informers and media-gobetweens maintain chummy, cordial relationships as elites who help to maintain an ongoing
game of leaks within the executive’s larger “information control regime.”93

Back Region Teammates and Definitional Disruptions
Leaker-informers and media-go-betweens could be described as provisional teammates in
the back region performances of both governance and media production. Goffman describes a
teammate as “someone whose dramaturgical co-operation [...] is dependent upon in fostering a
given definition of the situation.”94 Leaker-informers surreptitiously refuse dramaturgical co-
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operation with their original, government teammates; they provide the media with scenes and
props from the back region that can be used to undermine the government’s front region
“definition of the situation.”95 The “definition of the situation”96 is not only important for
cultivating back region cohesion amongst teammates,97 but also for maintaining a consistent,
“projected definition”98 in the front region. This projected definition has “distinctive moral
character,”99 writes Goffman:
Society is organized on the principle that any individual who possesses certain social
characteristics has a moral right to expect that others will value and treat him in
correspondingly appropriate way…When an individual projects a definition of the
situation and thereby makes an implicit or explicit claim to be a person of a particular
kind, he automatically exerts a moral demand upon the others, obliging them to value and
treat him in the manner that persons of his kind have a right to expect…The others find,
then, that the individual has informed them as to what is and as to what they ought to see
as the “is.”100
Back region performances tarnish the projected front region definitions and moral demands that
politicians and their teams have worked to foster.101 Leaker-informers are perceived by their
original teammates as grave, internal threats precisely because they possess and transfer evidence
that undermines government’s claim to be what it is. In order to avoid such definitional
disruptions, back region performers engage in “preventative practices” as precaution against
embarrassments.102 During episodes of leak panic,103 back region actors employ aggressive
methods to halt ongoing threats to definitional disruptions, in addition to preemptive measures to
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ward off future attempts. For example, Nixon established the infamous plumbers, who were
tasked with ‘plugging leaks’ from within his Administration.104 Reagan attempted to institute
broad usage of polygraph tests among government officials, and also place FBI agents on-call to
investigate leaks as they appeared.105 Obama turned to the legal system to prevent leaks; he
prosecuted more whistleblower and leak cases than both Bush administrations and Regan .106
Although Obama claimed to support increased transparency in government, his aggressive
prosecution of leakers demonstrates the sensitives of the executive to perceived threats to their
“information control regime.”107 For performers who endeavor to support dissent, or sow the
public’s doubt in existing power dynamics, leaks can serve as the instance and evidence of
definitional disruptions.108 Leaks can validate feelings of dissonance among front region
audiences, as they are proof of politicians’ contradictory front and back region identities, and
thus breaches of trust.109

Outsiders and Shame
Although leakers, whistleblowers, and hackers may claim differing motivations, their
actions have a unifying structural thread: the disclosure of information locates the public to the
role of an outside intruder.110 When a scene or prop is leaked to the front region, the public is
given a momentary glimpse at the quotidian performances of the back region. Goffman writes,
“When an outsider accidentally enters a region in which a performance is being given, or when a
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member of the audience inadvertently enters the backstage, the intruder is likely to catch those
present flagrante delicto.”111 In Goffman’s scenario, the intrusion is accidental, and for public
audiences, the leak may feel unintentional or unplanned. However, the media leak is most often
an intentional act, which deliberately portrays back region actors in flagrante delicto. This
disclosure, or reveal, can cause “problems in impression management,”112 and subsequent
feelings of embarrassment, shame, and discomfort for all involved. In his essay, “Embarrassment
and Social Organization,” Goffman writes, “…Occasions of embarrassment arise when the self
projected is somehow confronted with another self which, through valid in other contexts, cannot
be here sustained in harmony with the first.113 The leak, which desegregates front and back
region audiences, can function as a shaming action, and remind or inform publics that much of
the business of governing occurs behind closed doors where elected officials perform out of
character. The Access Hollywood leak, for example, depicts a back region performance that is in
conflict with the pre-Trump era, normative role of president. It is common, though not certain,
that back region actors will exhibit regret following the episode, as Billy Bush had said in his
apology, said, “I’m embarrassed and ashamed.”114

Other Discrepant Leakers
During the 2012 presidential campaign, a bartender covertly filmed Mitt Romney at a
campaign event with republican donors, each of whom paid $50,000 to attend.115 The bartender,
in this scenario, represents another discrepant role, known as the “non-person,” who is neither
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audience member nor actor, and is described by Goffman as “someone who isn’t there.”116 Nonpersons possess back region access, but they are not members of the elite. At the campaign
event, the bartender filmed Romney giving a speech, where he said, “There are 47 percent who
are with him [Obama]…who are dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims,
who believe the government has a responsibility to care for them …My job is not to worry about
those people.117 Romney did not immediately disown or apologize for his comments. Rather,
only after the Obama campaign used the leaked video in multiple ads, which affected Romney’s
poll numbers, did Romney exhibit remorse.119 In this scenario, the leak was used as a prop in a
performance to delegitimize the opposing team and direct the attention of the front region
publics. Romney and Billy Bush’s performances of shame and remorse following the leak are
attempts to then reclaim the public’s attention and repair definitional disruptions.
Similar to the discrepant role of non-person, “service specialists”120 also have back region
access, but are without organic ties to the team. “Service specialists,” writes Goffman, “are like
members of the team in that they learn the secrets of the show and obtain a backstage view of it.
Unlike members of the team, however, the specialist does not share the risk, the guilt, and the
satisfaction of presenting before an audience the show to which he has contributed.121 In contrast
to leaker-informers who are socialized into the “Washington power culture,”122 the service
specialist is subjected to a more stringent and formal versions of “discretion.”123 Edward
Snowden, a contractor with Booz Allen Hamilton, is an example of a service specialists turned
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leaker-informer. The role of the service specialist is reminiscent of Simmel’s stranger; someone
who embodies both nearness and remoteness, and “like the poor and like sundry ‘inner enemies’
is an element of the group itself.”124 Again, regardless Snowden’s claims of a moral obligation to
disclose classified information as a whistleblower, it was his is structural position that gave him
the ability to perform as leaker-informers.

Conclusion
In theorizing the game of leaks, I employ Goffman’s schema of performative roles to
illustrate relationships between back region actors in the government and the media. Goffman’s
conception of front and back regions helps clarify how leaks are curated by leaker-informers and
intentionally delivered to media-go-betweens, who frame and amplify the leak for publics.
Additionally, as we will see in the coming chapters, I revisit Goffman’s identification of
embarrassment and shame as a byproduct of “problems in impression management”125 and how
these emotions function in the government’s retaliation against leakers.
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Chapter 3: Case Study of Thomas Drake
The evolution of a back region government employee to a leaker-informer on trial for
espionage follows a specific plotline of events. This chapter uses the case of Thomas Drake, an
N.S.A. employee who became a leaker-informer following 9/11, to illustrate structural patterns
evident in the environment and actions of leaker-informers, and their subsequent prosecutions
brought by the government. The patterned behavior available in the Drake case provide a
template for how the leaker-informer and government react to one another.
As we will see in the Drake case, the template begins with a contradiction in the
government’s front and back region “definitions of the situation.”126 A back region actor,
disturbed by the contradiction, looks for coworkers who share her distress or unease. These
colleagues form a new ‘team’ and attempt to address their concerns through ‘proper channels.’
When they are rebuffed, back region actor becomes a leaker-informer and seeks redress through
the media. The media publicizes the actor’s concerns, which in turn shames the government. As
the leaker-informer is not a ‘legitimate’127 player in the game of leaks, the government retaliates
through legal and illegal means, and conflates the leaker-informer’s disclosures with espionage.
The Drake case demonstrates that if the content of the leak, and ‘bad press’ surrounding the
disclosure, embarrasses the government or potentially hinders the American war project, the
‘illegitimate’ leaker-informer will be targeted for prosecution.
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Back Region Realignments
Prior to 9/11, the N.S.A.’s technological capabilities had failed to adapt to the speedy
transformations of internet-based communications.128 To address some of the organization’s
technological flaws, the Agency turned to Thomas Drake, a veteran of the Air Force and Navy,
who was regarded as an expert in “military crypto-electronics.”129 Drake had already worked
with the N.S.A. as a software contractor from 1989 to 2001. He was eventually hired as a fulltime employee, working under Maureen Baginiski, head of the N.S.A.’s Signals Intelligence
Directorate. His first day on the job was September 11th, 2001.130
While working as a contractor, Drake had met Bill Binney, a longtime N.S.A. employee
and seasoned technical director. Binney believed that the N.S.A.’s most pressing challenge was
“data overload.”131 The agency’s model of intelligence collection had been to amass digital
information and then send it to the appropriate parties for analysis. Binney and his team offered
an inverse model of collection; their program, a computer application known as ThinThread,
“processed information as it was collected—discarding useless information on the spot and
avoiding the overload problem that plagued centralized systems.”132 ThinThread worked “nearly
perfectly” during test runs.133 However, the program initially failed to distinguish domestic from
foreign communications, which meant that Americans could be monitored without a warrant.
Binney fixed this issue by adding an “anonymizing feature,” which allowed Americans’
communications to be encrypted until a warrant was obtained by the investigating agency.134
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Despite the successful tests of ThinThread prior to 9/11, N.S.A. Director Michael Hayden
pivoted away from the project; attorneys at the N.S.A. had warned that the program could
potentially violate Americans’ constitutional rights.135 Hayden favored a competing
communications surveillance program, known as Trailblazer, and hired private defense
contractors to usher it into existence. According to author Matthew Aid, “The resistance to
ThinThread was just standard bureaucratic politics. ThinThread was small, cost-effective, easy to
understand, and protected the identity of Americans. But it wasn’t what the higher-ups wanted.
They wanted a big machine that could make Martinis, too.”136
Trailblazer was not fully operational when 9/11 occurred.137 Following the attacks, Drake
believed ThinThread “could be put into the fight.”138 He wrote a classified brief on the program
and gave it Baginiski, but she rebuffed his efforts. Drake said Baginski “wouldn’t respond
electronically. She just wrote in a black felt marker, ‘They’ve found a different solution.’”139 In
October 2001, Drake, Binney, and others inside the N.S.A. began hearing rumors about the
Agency engaging in warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications. Binney, disturbed
by the rumors, believed that the N.S.A. was using a “bastardized version”140 of ThinThread
without the anonymizing features. Drake had also observed that “strange things were happening
[at the Agency]. Equipment was being moved. People were coming to me and saying, ‘We’re
now targeting our own country!...I was concerned that is was illegal, and none of it was
necessary...It wasn’t just that the breaks came off after 9/11 - we were in a whole different
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vehicle.”141 Drake expressed his concerns about the rumors to Baginiski, who told him to contact
the N.S.A.’s general counsel if he wanted to pursue the matter. Drake claims he spoke with Vito
Potenza, the Agency’s deputy general counsel, who allegedly said, “Don’t worry about it. We’re
the executive agent for the White House. It’s all been scrubbed. It’s legal...It’s none of your
business.”142 Binney and his wife, who also worked at the N.S.A., along with colleagues Ed
Loomis and J. Kirk Wiebe, all retired from the agency on October 31, 2001. Binney said, “I
couldn’t be an accessory to subverting the constitution.”143
Diane Roark, a long-time employee of the House Intelligence Committee, who had been
in contact with Binney, Wiebe, and Drake, had also heard accounts of the N.S.A.’s post-9/11
pivot to warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications. She claims to have expressed
her concerns about the illegality of the program to Representatives Porter Goss and Nancy
Pelosi, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, and David Addington, an advisor to Vice President
Dick Cheney, who was actually a supporter of the program. Roark’s concerns, like Drake’s, were
ignored by her superiors. “This was such a Catch-22...There was no one to go to,” she said.144
The events of 9/11 had disrupted front and back region “definitions of the situation”145
for N.S.A. employees. As the Bush Administration attempted to craft new front region
“definitions,” they also enacted clandestine shifts in back region policies through the
‘bastardization’ of ThinThread. These shifts in turn restructured allegiances amongst back region
teammates at the N.S.A. Prior to 9/11, Hayden had been wary of surveillance programs that were
“too invasive of Americans’ privacy;”146 afterwards, he embraced an approach that intentionally
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and systematically breached Americans’ privacy. The retirement of Binney and other
government employees was an act of noncompliance; they openly refused to cooperate as
teammates in performances of new “definitions of the situation.”147
Drake, in contrast to his retired colleagues, surreptitiously, rather than blatantly, refused
dramaturgical cooperation with his back region teammates. Drake decided to serve as a leakerinformer; he gave top-secret documents about the N.S.A.’s pre-9/11 intelligence failures to
Roark and others in Congress. Although he was effectively leaking from one back region to
another, he was still in violation of N.S.A. rules, which forbade interagency communications
without approval.148 Drake was playing a ‘double game’ by participating in back region
performances of new “definition of the situations,”149 all the while ‘selling out the show’150 to
Congressional staffers.
In September 2002, Binney, Wiebe, Loomis, and Roark filed a confidential complaint
with the Office of the Inspector General (IG) at the N.S.A. The group was rebuffed, so they filed
yet another confidential complaint with the IG at the Department of Defense.151 The complaint
was not focused on the warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications, but rather the
benefits of the original ThinThread program and the failures of Trailblazer.152 Drake was not a
signatory to the complaint, as he was still employed at the N.S.A., but served as a leakerinformer by providing the group with “documents aimed at proving waste, fraud, and abuse”
relating to Trailblazer.153 By collaborating on the IG complaint, Drake, Binney, Wiebe, Loomis,
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and Roark, acted as new group of ‘teammates,’ who sought to establish another “definition of the
situation.”154 This new team’s definition framed the government’s implementation of Trailblazer
as an egregious error; in their narrative, if a ‘clean’ version of ThinThread with the anonymizing
feature had been selected instead, 9/11 could have been prevented.155

Reassigning Shame
The rumors of domestic surveillance that Drake and his ‘teammates’ had heard in 2001
was ushered into the view of front region publics in December 2005. James Risen and Eric
Lichtblau, reporters for the New York Times, wrote an article titled, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on
Callers Without Courts.”156 Risen and Lichtblau had been leaked information about the N.S.A.’s
post-9/11 warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications. The Times had actually
known about the surveillance program for more than a year prior to the 2005 article but refrained
from publishing because President Bush had intimated to the paper’s editors that “you’ll have
blood on your hands.”157 Following the release of Risen and Lichtblau’s article, Bush said the
leak to the Times was “a shameful act” and ordered the Justice Department to investigate.158
The Times leak brought the shifts in N.S.A.’s back region policies to front region publics.
The leak, which functioned as a shaming action against the government, exposed the
contradictions of the Bush Administration’s front and back region performances. Instead of
claiming responsibility for the discrepancies, Bush attempted to redirect the shame onto the
media-go-betweens and the unknown leaker-informer. Bush’s direction to the Justice
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Department to find and prosecute the leaker was an effort to prevent any further definitional
disruptions of his Administration’s front region performances.
Additionally, the suggestion that the Times will have ‘blood on its hands’ for publishing
the leak demonstrates how the government attempts to frame leaks as crimes against the body of
the American soldier, rather than a crime of information disclosure. Bush’s statement directs the
attention of front region actors to an imagined harm against a physical body, like a “soldier in the
field.”159 In the post-9/11 wars, Bush framed the American soldier in the vein of the World War
II liberators, who were “moral protagonist[s]” and “heroic carriers of the good.”160 In claiming
that the Times will have ‘blood on its hands,’ Bush is shifting blame for harm to the sacred body
of the American soldier onto media-go-betweens and leaker-informers.
In light of the Times story, Congress held hearings about the extent of the N.S.A.’s post9/11 warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications. The Bush Administration justified
their shift in policy by claiming “that the traditional method of getting warrants was too slow for
the urgent threats posed by international terrorism.”161 Drake was dismayed by the Bush
Administration’s response; he said, “They were lying through their teeth. They had chose to go
an illegal route, and it wasn’t because they had no other choice...I was faced with a crisis of
conscience. What do I do—remain silent, and complicit, or go to the press?”162
In Drake’s deliberation, we see evidence of his experience as what DeGloma calls, an
“awakening.”163 DeGloma explains that “individuals tell awakening stories to explain a radical
transformation of consciousness, a fundamental change in their perception of their lives and their
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orientation to the world around them.”164 Drake’s “crisis of conscience” reveals how he
differentiated his past self, one tainted by silence and complicity, from a present self that is
oriented towards revealing the ‘truth’ about the Bush Administration’s policy shift.165 Although
Drake had already acted as a leaker-informer, and made efforts to surreptitiously separate
himself from his colleagues who were complying with the post- 9/11 “definition of the
situation,”166 his decision to seek redress through the press became the “transformative
experience”167 that directed the trajectory of his future actions.
Following the Administration’s response to the congressional hearings, Drake asked
Roark to help him get in touch with Siobhan Gorman, a reporter for the Baltimore Sun, who had
written extensively about national security issues. Roark reminded Drake about the extreme
repercussions the N.S.A. inflicts against those who “embarrass” the organization.168 At first,
Drake contacted Gorman through a secure email account and sent her anonymous tips, but he
eventually identified himself and met her in person to discuss his concerns.169 From January
2006 to November 2007, Gorman wrote170 a series of articles about the N.S.A., including a
feature about management problems171 with Trailblazer.
There was disagreement in the intelligence community as to whether or not Drake
provided classified information to Gorman.172 Author Matthew Aid said the articles were
“embarrassing to N.S.A. management, but embarrassment to the U.S. government is not a
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criminal offense in this country.”173 Contrary to Aid’s claims, embarrassment and shame as
products of definitional disruptions can in fact incite the government to frame leaks as crimes, in
particular as offenses against the body of the American soldier and the body of the state.
Proper Channels and Targets
The Bush Administration assembled a group of twenty-five federal agents and five
prosecutors to find the Times leaker. The team was pursuing “some two hundred possible
targets,” but had not yet discovered the source of the disclosure to the Times.174 When Gorman’s
article series on the N.S.A. appeared in the Sun, some agents speculated that the Sun and Times’
reporters had the same source.175 Although a link between the Sun and the Times sources was
never found, the F.B.I. redirected their prosecutorial focus to critics of Trailblazer. An
intelligence expert said, “It’s sad. I think they were aiming at the Times leak and found this
[leaks to Gorman] instead.”176
Armed F.B.I. agents raided the homes of Roark, Binney and Wiebe on July 26, 2007.177
The agents confiscated computers, documents, and demanded information about the Times
leaker. Binney claims that agents encouraged him to name Roark as Times leaker. In turn, Roark
says that the agents wanted her to pin the leak on Drake. About four months after the July raids,
the F.B.I. descended on Drake’s home. At first, Drake attempted to cooperate; he spoke without
a lawyer and provided details about the failures of Trailblazer. However, Drake soon learned that
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the agents were only interested the Times leak,178 as it had had deeply shamed the Bush
Administration and disrupted their clandestine expansion of surveillance powers.
Wiebe said the raids on the teams’ homes were “retribution for our filing the Inspector
General complaint.”179 Jesselyn Radack, an attorney at the Government Accountability Project
and one of Drake’s lawyers, agreed: “It’s the most severe form of whistleblower retaliation I
have ever seen.”180 Government employees are encouraged to voice their dissent through
confidential and ‘proper’ channels, such as complaints to the IG.181 However, as is evident in the
Drake case, ‘proper’ methods of communication are not necessarily confidential, nor are they
structured to protect dissenters. Sanctioned methods of communication can serve to mark targets
and silence employees.182 Additionally, these ‘proper’ channels also reinforce boundaries
surrounding ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’183 players in the game of leaks.184 ‘Proper’ channels
and complaints to the IG are not intended for high-ranking officials, or ‘legitimate’185 players,
who can deliver their opinions or concerns directly to elite media outlets. Rather, ‘proper’
channels are designed for lower and mid-level employees, or ‘illegitimate’ players, who lack
pathways to redress in both front and back regions.
In June 2010, some three years after the F.B.I. raids and two years into the Obama
Administration, Drake was charged with violating the Espionage Act, in addition to obstructing
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justice, and lying to the F.B.I.186 However, the charges against Drake did not stem from his leaks
to Gorman, but rather documents and emails that the F.B.I. retrieved during the raid on his home.
The documents in question included a schedule of meetings that was categorized as
“unclassified/ for official use only,” though the government claimed that the schedule “should
have been classified, and Drake should have known this.”187 James Wyda, Drake’s lawyer, said
that his client had unintentionally retained the “benign” documents, and his actions did not
warrant such serious charges.188 However, William Welch, the prosecutor, painted a more dire
picture during a pre-trial hearing:
...This not an issue of benign documents, and it’s not an issue of insignificant documents.
It’s very easy, for example, to talk about satellite photographs, and it’s easy to talk about
battleships and military troop movements as national defense information, but this case is
different because N.S.A. does not have battleships and they don’t have satellite
photographs, and they don’t have troops, but, rather, what they do is they collect
intelligence for the soldier in the field. So, when individuals go out and they harm that
ability, our intelligence goes dark, and our soldier in the field gets harmed.189
Welch reframes Drake’s alleged crime of information retention (no longer information
disclosure) as a crime that could harm “our soldier in the field.”190 Similar to Bush’s claim that
the Times would have ‘blood on its hands,’ Welch asserts that Drake’s actions could cause direct
harm to the soldier’s body. The leaker-informer is thus guilty of endangering the sacred
American soldier and the state’s position as the “moral protagonist.”191
John Crane, a former Assistant Inspector General at Department of Defense, claims that
the government’s retaliation against Drake was not only intentional, but also accomplished
through illegal means. Crane states that following the Times’ reports about warrantless
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surveillance, a high-level official at the IG provided the F.B.I. with the names of Drake and his
‘teammates’ directly from their IG report about Trailblazer.192 Additionally, when Drake’s
lawyer requested documents from the IG relating to his case, officials said they couldn’t provide
any information because clerical staff had “fucked up” and “shredded the documents in a
supposedly routine purge of the IG’s vast stores of confidential material.”193 Crane, shocked by
the news that materials had been destroyed, was told by his superiors that he should be a “team
player.”194 Crane refused to be a “team player” and rejected dramaturgical cooperation in back
region performances surrounding the Drake case; he became a whistleblower and accused his
superiors at the IG of aiding the illegal and retaliatory actions against Drake.195 It is evident in
Crane’s allegations that back region government officials had to go to extraordinary and illegal
measures to support their illusory claims that Drake was a threat to national security and a
criminal guilty of espionage.
A little more than a year after Drake was charged, the government offered him a deal.196
In exchange for pleading guilty to one misdemeanor charge of “exceeding his authorized access
to government computers,”197 the government dropped the original ten felony charges, including
the alleged violation of the Espionage Act. Steven Aftergood, a transparency advocate at the
Federation of American Scientists, said “The outcome pales in comparison to the opening
thunder of the indictment and that shows that the government miscalculated both the severity of
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the offense and the quality of its own evidence.”198 Drake, along with his ‘teammates,’ who were
not charged, did not serve any time in jail.
Officials in Obama’s Justice Department described the prosecutions of leakers, like
Drake, as an imperative.199 Lanny Breuer, Obama’s head of the criminal division at the Justice
Department said, “You don’t get to break the law and disclose classified information just
because you want to...Politics should play no role in it [the prosecution] whatsoever.” “Politics,”
in terms of party affiliation, may play a minor role in determining who is prosecuted for leaking
and/or retaining classified documents, and who is not. A more primary factor in targeting and
prosecuting offenders is determining whether or not the accused is considered a ‘legitimate’ or
‘illegitimate’200 player in the game of leaks. ‘Legitimate’ players (such as John Deutch, C.I.A.
Director under Clinton, and Alberto Gonzales, the Attorney General under Bush), who are
accused of retaining classified documents,201 often receive token admonishments. In contrast,
Drake, an ‘illegitimate’ player, was treated as a traitor, charged under the Espionage Act, and
blamed for causing potential harm to ‘soldiers in the field.’ Whether or not the back region
actor(s) retained classified documents by accident, or on purpose with the goal of acting as a
leaker or whistleblower, the intention for retention is of little consequence. Rather, as is evident
in the Drake case, a back region actor will become a target for prosecution if she is an
‘illegitimate’202 player in the game of leaks, and her actions lead to the shaming of government
officials or policies in the front region.
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Conclusion
The Drake case serves as a template for how a back region government employee can
evolve into a leaker-informer. The Bush Administration’s contradictory front and back region
“definitions of the situation”203 were the primary instigations for Drake to find new ‘teammates’
and eventually turn to the media to find redress for his concerns. As Drake was not a
‘legitimate’204 player in the game of leaks, he was targeted, prosecuted for espionage, and
accused with causing potential harm to the bodies of ‘soldiers in the field.’ The Drake case
demonstrates that if the executive is shamed by the content of the leaked material, or the
American war project is jeopardized, the leaker will face aggressive and illegal retaliation from
the government.
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Chapter 4: Case Study of Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers
There’s a scene in the documentary, The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel
Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers, where Ellsberg describes a flight he took in October 1966
with Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense. McNamara asks Ellsberg if the U.S. position
in Vietnam had improved over the previous year with the addition of 100,000 troops. Ellsberg
replies that the situation is “the same.” McNamara concludes that if the situation is the same,
then it’s actually worse because the additional troops failed to improve the situation. When the
plane lands at Andrews Air Force Base, McNamara tells a group of reporters that “military
progress in the past twelve months has exceeded our expectations.” Ellsberg says, “I was
thinking, I hope I’m never in a job where I have to lie like that.”205
As is evident in this episode, the Johnson and Nixon Administration’s contradictory front
and back region performances of the Vietnam War came to play a significant role in the story of
Daniel Ellsberg and the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers. This chapter uses the template of
events established in Chapter 3 to examine the executive’s patterned responses to Ellsberg as an
‘illegitimate’ leaker-informer. In keeping with the template of the Drake case, Ellsberg joined a
group of ‘teammates,’ who attempted to voice their concerns through ‘proper’ channels, prior to
Ellsberg’s decision to leak the Pentagon Papers to the press. Additionally, as the government
framed Drake’s leak as a crime against the body of the American soldier, Ellsberg’s leak of the
Pentagon Papers was reconstructed as a crime against the body of the state. 206
Ellsberg’s story is complex and spans many years; as a result, this chapter only address
specific portions of Ellsberg’s narrative that are pertinent to the executive’s game of leaks. The
similarities between the Drake and Ellsberg cases demonstrate that regardless of the leaker205
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informer’s motivations or intentions, she will be treated by the executive as an insider threat and
a traitor to the government if she is an ‘illegitimate’ player in the game.

War as a Well-Kept Secret
Ellsberg had an extensive and varied perspective of the government’s back region
performances during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations. He was a
platoon leader in the Marines from 1954 to 1957, and in 1959, while a doctoral student in
economics at Harvard, he started working as an analyst at the RAND Corporation, a think tank
focused on military and defense strategy. As a scholar of decision theory, Ellsberg worked as a
consultant to the Defense Department, and in 1962, he helped draft McNamara’s operational
plans for nuclear war. He graduated from Harvard in 1962 and joined the Defense Department in
1964 as a Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defense, John McNaughton. From 1965 to
1967 he served in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. 207
Ellsberg witnessed the contradictory front and back region ‘definitions’ of the Vietnam
War as early as 1964 during the Gulf of Tonkin incident. While President Johnson claimed to the
press and front region publics that he did not intend to escalate the war, Ellsberg was surprised to
learn that his job as a Special Assistant was in fact designed to help the Johnson Administration
prepare for a “wider war.” Ellsberg said the escalation of the Vietnam War was a “well-kept
secret by thousands and thousands of people, including me.”208
Ellsberg returned to RAND in 1967 and was contracted by the Defense Department to
work on a comprehensive review of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. This study, which was
ordered by McNamara, came to be known as the Pentagon Papers; it included some 7,000 pages
207
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and covered 23 years of history, from 1945 to 1968.209 As Ellsberg and other RAND analysts had
contributed to the report, a copy of it was kept under lock and key at the RAND offices.210
In August and September 1969, Ellsberg read the early history of the war as detailed in
the Pentagon Papers.211 As a result, he experienced and “awakening,”212 and changed his view of
the American involvement in the war:
From mid ’67 on, I had been for ending the war ‘as soon as possible,’ but I still had a
willingness to see it prolonged by weeks or months in the course of negotiations, in hopes
of a somewhat better solution that would leave us with a less controversial ending and
perhaps less of a domestic backlash. But by mid-1969 I began to see that domestic
politics couldn’t excuse it. I finally saw continuation as immoral, not just mistaken.213
In addition to reading the Papers, Ellsberg relays another “awakening”214 episode in his memoir,
Secrets. At the War Resisters’ International Conference in August 1969, Ellsberg heard a speech
by activist Randy Kehler, who explained that he was prepared to go jail for resisting the draft.
Kehler said to the crowd, “Right now I’m the only man left in the San Francisco WRL [War
Resisters League] office because all the others have gone the prison already…I can look forward
to jail, without any remorse of fear, and that’s because I know that everybody here and lots of
people around the world like you will carry on.”215 At that point, Ellsberg said he started to sob.
He wrote, “A line kept repeating itself in my head: We are eating our young. It was though an ex
had split my head and my heart broke open. But what had really happened was that my life had
split in two.”216
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Ellsberg describes his transformation from strategist for McNamara to antiwar advocate
through episodic “awakenings.”217 As noted in Chapter 1, Pozen and Hess claim that that leakers
likely “have multiple motivations or goals, some of them unconscious”218 for leaking
information from the back region to the front. In addition to Ellsberg’s formulated awakenings,
there are perhaps other provocations behind his decision to leak the Papers, such as egomania
and the “greater glory of Dan,”219 or a desire to cleanse feelings of guilt for his own participation
in furthering the war. The motivations for leaking, or claims to be acting as a whistleblower, for
Ellsberg, Drake and others, are irrelevant to the executive; if the individual is not a ‘legitimate’
player in the game of leaks, she will be treated as traitor and an insider threat.
In September 1969, Ellsberg decided to align himself with other back region colleagues
who shared his newfound perspective about the immorality of the war. Ellsberg said, “I went to
some people at RAND who had been for unilateral withdrawal all along, and said, “I’m with you
now; what shall we do about it?”220 Ellsberg and his new ‘team’ of RAND coworkers decided to
publish a letter, which advocated unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.221 The
letter, titled, “A Case Against Staying in Vietnam,” was published in the Washington Post and
signed by Ellsberg, in addition to six Rand employees: Melvin Gurtov, Oleg Hoeffding, Arnold
L. Horelick, Konrad Kellen, and Paul F. Langer.222 Ellsberg said the letter “was as controversial
at RAND and in the Defense community probably as my leak of the Pentagon Papers was later.
It was a bombshell among our associates…”223 Similarly, Mai Elliot, author of RAND in
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Southeast Asia, wrote, “A strong majority [of RAND colleagues] expressed animosity toward the
signers and were vociferous in condemning them for having violated the privileged relationship
between RAND and the government—a relationship they viewed as akin to that between a
lawyer and his client.”224 Through the letter, this new group of ‘teammates’ sought to inject the
public debate with a new ‘definition of the situation.’ Additionally, they separated themselves
from their RAND colleagues and other back region actors, who continued to support the Nixon
Administration’s front region illustration of the war. The letter to the editor was a public act of
refusal; the signers rejected dramaturgical cooperation with back region teammates, and a front
region ‘definition of the situation’ that promoted the war as a success.
While the team drafted the letter, Ellsberg began copying the Pentagon Papers in secret.
Ellsberg received access to a Xerox machine through his friend, Tony Russo, who had been
previously fired from RAND, possibly because of his antiwar views.225 Similar to Drake,
Ellsberg surreptitiously refused dramaturgical cooperation by choosing to act as a leakerinformer. Reflecting on his actions, Ellsberg said in 1973, “You see, with all the power the
president has to contradict and retaliate against a critic, to disprove him you need a
document.”226 For Ellsberg, the Pentagon Papers demonstrated a pattern of poor decision-making
to which he saw no end: “Each person in that [executive] office thought his predecessors had
made wrong decisions for stupid ideological and geopolitical reasons, whereas he was making
the same decisions for quite different, very clever, domestic political reasons. And so, year after
year, the war went on.”227
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As Drake and his teammates had attempted to use ‘proper’ channels to voice their
dissent, such as the IG reports, Ellsberg similarly attempted to express concerns to other back
region actors. Ellsberg had given the Papers to William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, in addition to Senator George McGovern and Representative Pete
McCloskey; he hoped the Congress would hold hearings about the war and the Papers would be
read into the official record. In September 1970, Ellsberg even attempted to sway Henry
Kissinger to read the Papers.228 Ellsberg, like Drake, went to the press with the Papers when he
perceived that he had exhausted his ‘proper’ channels, and had ‘nowhere else to go.’ The press is
a not the leaker’s first choice, but rather her last option for redress.

Discretion and Retaliation
In a New Yorker column titled, “Daniel Ellsberg, Edward Snowden, and the Modern
Whistle-Blower,” critic Malcolm Gladwell contrasts the credentials of Ellsberg, who studied
with a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Harvard, to Snowden, “a community-college dropout,
[and] a member of the murky hacking counterculture.”229 Gladwell writes that Snowden learned
the “innermost secrets” of the N.S.A. because he was a “technician,” unlike Ellsberg, who was
directly involved in policymaking and war planning. “Had Snowden been a whistle-blower in
1967, at the launch of the Pentagon Papers,” writes Gladwell, “he would have blown the whistle
on Daniel Ellsberg. The whistle-blower as insider has become the whistle-blower as outsider.”230
Gladwell’s conception of the insider-outsider divide is too simplistic to explain the differences
and similarities between Ellsberg and Snowden. To return to Goffman, it is clear that Snowden
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occupied the role of service specialist who learned, “the secrets of the show and obtain[ed] a
backstage view of it.”231 Although Snowden was not a member of elite policy makers, he was
still nonetheless a back region actor, who had access to highly classified material. And despite
Ellsberg’s elite credentials, he too was treated as a traitor, like Snowden and Drake. In the game
of leaks, regardless of your educational pedigree or enmeshment in “Washington power
culture,”232 if you are deemed an ‘illegitimate’ player by the government, you will be prosecuted
as a traitor.
Ellsberg actually displayed an acute understanding of the game of leaks, and the actions
that a leaky executive would tolerate from ‘legitimate’ players. In a 1973 interview with Rolling
Stone, Ellsberg said:
People who wrote memoirs – and who hoped to be employed by some future president –
would tell all the substance of the information, but they would be careful not to disclose
that they were directly quoting from a document. It’s not necessarily because they were
partisans of a particular president, but there are certain things an insider doesn’t disclose
about a president, even one from whom he has resigned. Not only can the president still
retaliate, but if you plan to stay in the market for future executive service, you have to
show discipline in your discretion; you have to make it quite clear that no matter what the
provocation, there are some things you won’t tell about a boss – above all, you won’t hit
him with documents.233
In disclosing the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg disregarded the “discretion” shown by ‘legitimate’
players, who wished to remain employable in politics. However, as is evident in his trial,
Ellsberg did not dispense with discretion entirely.
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Spies and Plumbers
In January 1973, the government charged Ellsberg with espionage, theft, and
conspiracy.234 Ellsberg’s case is significant in American legal history, as he was the first leaker
to be tried under the Espionage Act;235 previously, the Act had only been applied to defendants
charged as spies. The prosecution in Ellsberg’s case attempted to paint him as a thief, whose
actions could have aided the enemy.236 A New York Times article explained that the government
had to prove that in leaking the Papers, the “country's national defense was injured.”237 The
prosecution relied on the testimony of military officials and generals, one of whom made the
claim that the release of the Papers could help the Vietcong understand U.S. war planning, and
were thus a broad threat to national security.238 Despite these claims, Ellsberg did maintain a
level of “discretion” in curating the Papers, as he had omitted portions of the Papers related to
ongoing negotiations.239 Additionally, the Papers only referenced events up to March 1968,
which by the time of Ellsberg’s disclosure to the press in 1971, made any information related to
American military strategies out of date.
As Drake was charged with causing potential harm to the bodies of ‘soldiers in the field,’
Ellsberg was framed as instigating a broader, more amorphous harm to the body of the state.
Although Ellsberg and Drake were not spies, by charging them under the Espionage Act, the
government conflated the act of leaking with the crimes of spying against United States. As the
charges against Ellsberg demonstrate, if the government is shamed by the content of the
disclosed material, the leaker will face retaliation within and outside the bounds of the law.
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The Ellsberg case is significant not only for the novel application of the Espionage Act,
but also for revealing the existence of Nixon’s ‘Plumbers,’ who were created to ‘plug’ leaks
stemming from within and outside the White House. In April 1973, prosecutors informed the
judge presiding over Ellsberg’s trial that the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist was burglarized.240
E. Howard Hunt, a former C.I.A. agent, had assembled a group of conspirators, known as the
Plumber,s to obtain information from the psychiatrist’s files in order to “discredit” Ellsberg and
his mental state.241 Egil Krogh, a Deputy Assistant to Nixon, recalled a meeting with the
Plumbers to discuss the break-in:
Mr. Hunt urged us to carry out a “covert operation” to get a “mother lode” of
information…Mr. Liddy told us the F.B.I. had frequently carried out such covert
operations — a euphemism for burglaries — in national security investigations, that he
had even done some himself. …At no time did I or anyone else there question whether
the operation was necessary, legal or moral. Convinced that we were responding
legitimately to a national security crisis, we focused instead on the operational details:
who would do what, when and where.242
Although the Plumbers are generally known for the infamous break-in of the Democratic
Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel, the first public acknowledgement of the group occurred
during the Ellsberg trial. In addition, it was also revealed that F.B.I. had “picked up” Ellsberg on
a wiretap in 1969 and 1970, but claimed that “all records and logs of those conversations had
disappeared.”243 After learning about both the break-in and the wiretap, the judge said the
government’s actions “offended a sense of justice” and “threatened the defendants' rights to a fair
trial;” as a result, the judge declared a mistrial.244 It is not a coincidence that evidence of
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government misconduct arose in the cases of Drake and Ellsberg. The executive viewed Drake
and Ellsberg as ‘illegitimate’ players in the game of leaks, and as a result, engaged in illegal and
aggressive retaliatory measures in the name of protecting the sacred bodies of the American state
and its soldiers.

Conclusion
Ellsberg and the Nixon administration were engaged in a series of patterned responses,
which were initially provoked by contradictory front and back region performances of the
Vietnam War. Ellsberg’s evolution into a leaker-informer mirrored Drake’s behavior, which
included joining a group of ‘teammates’ who attempted to voice their concerns through ‘proper’
channels. Whether Ellsberg’s disclosures to the press were motivated by a desire to end a war or
feed an ego are irrelevant; he was an ‘illegitimate’ player in the game of leaks and thus subject to
the aggressive retaliation from a shamed executive.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
On April 13, 2018, Donald Trump tweeted, “DOJ just issued the McCabe report - which
is a total disaster. He LIED! LIED! LIED! McCabe was totally controlled by Comey - McCabe
is Comey!! No collusion, all made up by this den of thieves and lowlifes!”245 In this tweet,
Trump references Andrew McCabe, a former Deputy Director of the F.B.I., who worked under
James Comey, the former Director of the F.B.I. It is unknown if Trump is calling the “DOJ” or
the “McCabe report” a “total disaster,” but his tweet is clearly a response to the public release of
an IG report concerning McCabe’s alleged leak to a Wall Street Journal reporter. The leak in
question appeared in an October 31, 2016 article titled, “FBI in Internal Feud Over Hillary
Clinton Probe.” The article concerned the F.B.I.’s reexamination of misconduct by the Clinton
Foundation and was published just a few days before the election.246 The IG report concludes
that McCabe engaged in misconduct when he leaked “sensitive information”247 and that McCabe
“lacked candor”248 during the F.B.I.’s investigation of the leak. Stewart Baker, a former general
counsel of the National Security Agency and blogger, offered a summary the McCabe’s affair:
McCabe leaked dirt on the Justice Department, then misled FBI Director James Comey
about the source of the leak, then misled leak investigators over and over again. It’s hard
to read the report and feel that McCabe’s firing wasn’t earned. And yet, for all that,
there’s a bit of low tragedy in McCabe’s tale. For he was disgraced not because he was
evil, but because events conspired to turn his talent for regular old government
information management into a fatal flaw.249
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I am not sure if McCabe has a particular “talent” for leaking. Rather, if we return to Pozen’s
terminology, McCabe was a well-situated pleaker in the scheme of “regular old government
information management,” i.e. the game of leaks.
As discussed earlier, pleakers help to maintain the “legal and bureaucratic fog”250
surrounding leaks, which serves as a long-term benefit for the executive. McCabe’s case is
vaguely reminiscent of Scooter Libby’s. While Libby worked in the Vice President’s office, and
McCabe in the F.B.I, both officials would be considered ‘legitimate’ players in the game of
leaks. In 2007, Libby was prosecuted for leaking the name of a C.I.A. agent; he was convicted of
obstructing justice, lying under oath, and making false statements.251 About 11 years later, and
within days of tweeting about the IG report on McCabe, Trump pardoned Libby for all of his
crimes.252 McCabe’s case has been referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for criminal
prosecution; if convicted, McCabe could be prosecuted for offenses nearly identical to
Libby’s.253
While the pleaker’s enmeshment in “Washington power culture”254 often acts as a
deterrent for prosecution, we can see in Libby and McCabe’s cases that the boundaries
surrounding ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ leakers are not fixed. Rather, what separates
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ actors are changeable social norms, which are currently subject to
the whims of a flexible “Washington power culture”255 and an unpredictable executive.
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In “The Leaky Leviathan,” Pozen writes “Because there are so few leak prosecutions,
those that are brought can send powerful signals throughout government about the parameters of
permissible leaking.” He continues:
The sample size is too small, and the recent cases (several of which are ongoing) too
fresh, to distill neat lessons. But the general pattern suggests that the most vulnerable
officials are those lone wolves who speak with reporters outside the context of any active
interagency process — true leakers, not pleakers or planters, in this Article’s typology —
and whose claim to a whistleblowing purpose is complicated by evidence of dubious
tactics or dishonorable aims.256
Although this paper may lack a distillation of “neat lessons” about leak prosecutions, I have
offered a template which illuminates how the “true leaker” and government engage in a series of
patterned responses. As is evident in the cases of Drake and Ellsberg, an administration’s
contradictory front and back region “definitions of the situation”257 serve as the initial motivation
for a back region government employee to evolve into a leaker-informer. In contrast to Pozen’s
claim that these leaker-informers are “lone wolves,”258 I have demonstrated that they actually
part of a ‘team’ of dissenters. Drake worked with Binney, Wiebe, Loomis, and Roark to file
confidential complaints with the IGs at both the N.S.A. and Department of Defense. When these
‘proper’ channels failed to address the team’s concerns, Drake surreptitiously refused
dramaturgical cooperation and began leaking documents to a reporter. Similarly, Ellsberg formed
a ‘team’ of colleagues at RAND who made a public appeal for unilateral withdrawal from
Vietnam. Ellsberg also attempted to convince other back region actors, including elected
representatives, to read the Pentagon Papers and hold public hearings on the administration’s
contradictory claims about the progress of the Vietnam War. Both Drake and Ellsberg turned to
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the press as a last resort; after the ‘proper’ channels had failed them, they hoped the media would
use their curated leak to inject the front region debate with a new ‘definition of the situation.’
In my examination of the Drake and Ellberg cases, we can also dispute Pozen’s claim that
the “most vulnerable officials” are those “whose claim to a whistleblowing purpose is
complicated by evidence of dubious tactics or dishonorable aims.”259 As discussed earlier,
Ellsberg may have been motivated by a sincere desire to end the war, or feed an insatiable ego.
Although Drake did not engage in “dubious tactics or dishonorable aims,” and only leaked
information regarded to fraud and abuse, one could make an argument that he was perhaps a
vengeful bureaucrat, or possessed a savior complex. I demonstrate that if the content of the leak
brings shame to the executive, or threatens the American war project, the ‘illegitimate’ leaker
will be targeted for retaliation and prosecution regardless of her moral or legal claims to be a
whistleblower. Although I have only examined two cases in this paper, I believe that it is likely
that an embarrassed executive will retaliate against a ‘illegitimate’ leaker whether or not she
possessed “dubious tactics or dishonorable aims.”
The Drake and Ellsberg cases also prove that the government will use aggressive and
sometimes illegal measures to retaliate against ‘illegitimate’ leaker-informers. John Crane, a
former Assistant Inspector General at Department of Defense, claims that the IG illegally
unmasked Drake and his teammates’ identities and passed them to the F.B.I. Additionally, the
IG’s files were suspiciously destroyed in conflict with the government’s information retention
policies.260 The illegal tactics used against Ellsberg were even more egregious. Nixon’s infamous
Plumbers broke into Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office in an effort to find and publicize
compromising material. The F.B.I. also claimed that wiretap records of Ellsberg had inexplicably
259
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“disappeared.”261 It is evident that ‘illegitimate’ leaker-informers will be subjected to aggressive
retaliation within and outside the confines of the law.
Drake and Ellsberg were both charged under the Espionage Act even though neither of
them was accused of spying on behalf of a foreign power. Rather, the executive sought to
conflate the leaker-informer’s disclosures with the crime of espionage. Similarly, the executive
attempted to frame the offense of leaking into a crime against the sacred bodies of the American
soldier and the state. As Drake was accused of potentially causing harm to ‘soldiers in the field,’
Ellsberg was accused of violating the body of the state.
Although the details will vary, I believe the patterned responses of the executive to
information disclosures by ‘illegitimate’ leaker-informers will generally conform to the plotlines
I unearthed in the cases of Drake and Ellsberg. While additional research is certainly needed, I
believe that in the coming years, there will be a significant uptick in the number of prosecutions
of both ‘illegitimate’ and ‘legitimate’ leaker-informers, who will be charged under the Espionage
Act and charged with endangering the sacred bodies of the and American soldiers forever ‘in the
field.’
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